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This paper analyzes the impact of tax competition between two countries of un-
equal per-capita capital endowments on tax rates and eﬃciency when distorting wage,
residence-based and source-based capital taxes (or any combination of two instruments)
are available for governments. The national welfare costs and beneﬁts of tax rate varia-
tions areshown to be ambiguousin the asymmetric Nash equilibriumdue to the existence
of tax base and terms of trade eﬀects. Moreover,numerical simulation results indicate
that non-cooperative equilibria in Nash strategies are ineﬃcient from an international
perspective,even if residence-based capital taxes are in the set of tax instruments avail-
able to ﬁscal authorities.
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Capital tax competition has long been an issue in the theoretical literature. The early models
stress the negative consequences of non-cooperative tax setting on welfare and predict an
underprovision of local public goods in the symmetric Nash equilibrium between identical
countries [Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986); Wildasin (1989)]. In these models,owners of
mobile capital shift away their resources from high-tax to low-tax countries,oﬀering a more
favorable tax climate. Governments perceive a harmful capital outﬂow caused by source-
based capital taxes in the non-cooperative equilibrium,which raises marginal cost of public
funds and reduces public expenditures at an ineﬃcient low level.
A ﬁrst counterexample against the result that Nash strategies lead to an ineﬃcient equi-
librium is made by Frenkel,Razin and Sadka (1991) in a two-period model with endogenous
labor supply. Basically,their main conclusion is that a tax competition equ ilibrium between
small countries is constrained eﬃcient if residence-based capital taxes are available for ﬁscal
authorities. This eﬃciency result has been extended by Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991) to
the case of a symmetric Nash equilibrium in source-based and residence-based capital taxes
between (equal) non-price-taking countries. The Nash equilibrium also is eﬃcient if taxes
on the incomes of all factors subject to choice by households (i.e. labor and residence-based
capital taxes) are available for ﬁscal authorities [cf. Eggert (1998)].As is well-known by now,
results are strongly related to the Diamond-Mirrlees (1971) Production Eﬃciency lemma
that the closed economy’s equilibrium should be on the frontier of the aggregate production
set if a suﬃcient set of ﬁscal instruments is available [cf. Eggert and Hauﬂer (1998)].
The aforementioned literature considers symmetric Nash equilibria. The assumption of
identical countries has been relaxed by several authors who focused on diﬀerent population
sizes as an important determinant of international diﬀerences in tax rates provoked by
variable perceived tax elasticities. Bucovetsky (1991) and Wilson (1991) prove that a small
country undercuts its large neighbor and beneﬁts from non-cooperation. Since the smaller
of two otherwise identical countries is able to cut into the larger country’s tax base it
has the higher per-capita welfare in the Nash equilibrium compared to the case of full
coordination. However,the assumptions of the Production Eﬃciency lemma can be fulﬁlled
when countries only diﬀer in population sizes so that a decentral Nash equilibrium does
not have to be ineﬃcient. The argument is that there exists no motive for trade in capital
in these models,except for diﬀerences in tax rates. Hence,tax policies of governments
are characterized as internationally eﬃcient if,and only if,they replicate the benchmark
tax structure of the closed economy. It is rather straightforward then from the Production
Eﬃciency theorem that governments of countries which only diﬀer in population sizes have
the necessary incentives to internalize ﬁscal externalities in their self-interest,provided that
1ﬁscal authorities have access to the incomes of all factors subject to choice by households.
Just as in the case of large (but identical) countries discussed above,an eﬃcient equilibrium
can be established when taxes on wages and worldwide capital income are available.
Thus it is a relevant question to investigate into the strategic eﬀects of capital taxation
when countries diﬀer in their per-capita capital endowments and the Production Eﬃciency
lemma is not applicable because each government faces a diﬀerent budget constraint.1 We
set up a two-period-two-country model with endogenous labor supply where governments
have an (in)complete set of three tax instruments at their disposal: (i) a tax on labor income,
(ii) a tax on worldwide interest income of their residents and (iii) a tax on the capital stock
invested within their borders. In addition to the tax base eﬀects discerned in symmetric tax
competition models,terms of trade eﬀects are observed in the asymmetric Nash equilibrium
where pecuniary externalities prevail in addition to ﬁscal externalities [cf. DePater and Myers
(1994)]. The three tax instruments considered in the analysis aﬀect the net capital balance
of a country in quite diﬀerent ways and therefore have a variable strategic importance:
The source-based capital tax reduces national capital demand,whereas the residence-based
capital tax distorts capital supply decisions of residents. The wage tax distorts the national
labor market,tends to increase the marginal productivity of capital (due to the reduction
in labor supplied) and hence has an indirect eﬀect on the net capital balance.
Intuitively follows from that reasoning that the tax structure in a capital exporting
country diﬀers from the tax structure in a capital importing country. Since international
diﬀerences in tax rates depict a reason for ineﬃcient capital reallocations,the arguments in
favor of residence-based capital taxes derived from symmetric tax competition models are a
priori not transferable to the case of large countries which diﬀer in their per-capita capital
endowments.
In the paper we use both theoretical and numerical methods to gain some ﬁrst insights
into the question which international repercussions of distorting tax systems can be expected
in the Nash equilibrium between unequal countries. In a ﬁrst section the model is set up and
non-cooperative tax structures are derived. It then goes to discuss the components of the
non-cooperative tax rules,i.e. the tax base and terms of trade eﬀects provoked by the tax
instruments. The next section turns to a numerical analysis of the welfare implications of
international competition. Our simulation results indicate that local public goods in some
cases are provided at an ineﬃcient high level. But this result critically depends (i) on the
ﬁscal environment under consideration,i.e. the set of available tax instruments,and it is
1In a recent paper Keen and Piekkola (1997) derive guidelines for international tax policy when there
exist untaxed pure proﬁts and yet another condition of the Production Eﬃciency is violated. Homburg (1998)
distinguishes between a national and an international version of the production eﬃciency theorem. Basically,
the ﬁrst requires production taxes to vanish, the latter internationally harmonized source-based capital taxes.
2(ii) also determined by the sign of the country’s net capital balance. As a general result,
Nash equilibria prove to be ineﬃcient in all asymmetric cases regardless of the availability
of residence-based capital taxes.
2 The Model
In this ﬁrst section we develop a model similar to Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991) which
is extended for international diﬀerences in factor endowments,but we restrict our analysis
to the two-country case. In the two-period model individual agents in both countries are
assumed to maximize a utilityfunction which is separable between private and public goods:2
U (x1,x 2,F)+˜ U (g), (2.1)
where x1 and x2 denote private consumption in period one and two, F is leisure consumed
in the second period,and g is the supply of a local public good. Due to the usual separability
assumption goods consumed are independent of the level of public good supply,which is
determined by the government and thus exogenous from the perspective of the consumer.
Residents are price-takers and choose their levels of private consumption to maximize utility
subject to the two-period budget constraint:
x1 +
x2
r − tr =
w − tw
r − tr (T − F)+e, (2.2)
where
(r − tr) = rate of interest, r,net of the residence-based capital tax, tr,
(w − tw) = gross wage rate, w,net of the wage tax, tw,
(y − x1) = savings,equivalent to capital supplied by residents, s,
(T − F) = labor supply, L,
e,T = initial resource and time endowments.
Using the utility function (2.1) and the deﬁnitions introduced in the description of the
private resource constraint (2.2) gives the Lagrangean:
L≡U (e − s,x2,T− L) − λ[x2 − (w − tw)L − (r − tr)s]. (2.3)
2For notational convenience we can drop-out country-speciﬁc indices in most of the equations in this
section without a loss of information.
3We solve the problem deﬁned above in the usual way and arrive at the standard ﬁrst-order
conditions which determine utility maximizing labor and capital supply:
∂L
∂s
= −Us + λ(r − tr)=0 , (2.4a)
∂L
∂x2
= Ux − λ =0 , (2.4b)
∂L
∂L
= −Ul + λ(w − tr)=0 , (2.4c)
∂L
∂λ
=( w − tw)L +( r − tr)s − x2 =0 . (2.4d)
Applying the implicit function theorem to these conditions it can readily be shown that
price eﬀects on labor supply, L(·),and savings functions, s(·),generally are ambiguous in
sign due to the interaction of income and cross-price substitution eﬀects.
Therefore,we use compensated labor supply,
L(·),and savings functions,
s(·),for some
of the analysis. From the second-order conditions of the utility optimization problem follows
that own-price eﬀects of compensated factor supply are positive,and the symmetry of the
Slutsky matrices implies equality of all compensated cross-price elasticities. In line with
Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991) we assume that leisure is a Hicksian substitute with ﬁrst





where subscripts denote partial derivatives. It will prove helpful to decompose uncompen-
sated eﬀects using Slutsky equations. This establishes the following relationship between
uncompensated and Hicksian derivatives:
φ ≡ sL w − LL r = s
Lw − L
Lr, (2.5a)
ψ ≡ Ls r − ss w = L
sr − s
sw. (2.5b)
The productive sector of each country is described by a constant-returns-to-scale pro-
duction function, f(k,l),which relates each country’s output to the level of capital, k(·),
and labor, l(·),invested and employed in the country. The technology exhibits the usual
properties fk > 0, fl > 0, fkk < 0, fll < 0. Again,subscripts denote partial derivatives.
Normalizing the price of output to equal one,the familiar zero-proﬁt condition is given by:
f (k,l) − (r + ts)k − wl =0 . (2.6)
where we introduced the source-based capital tax ts as a third tax instrument. In accordance
with the capital tax competition literature,the source-based capital tax, ts,is levied on
4all capital invested in the home economy. The ﬁrst-order conditions for labor and capital
demanded by ﬁrms are:
fl − w =0 , (2.7a)
fk − (r + ts)=0 . (2.7b)
As the labor and capital markets are competitive,proﬁt maximization in the choice of labor
and capital by ﬁrms implies that marginal products of labor and capital must be equated
to their marginal costs. Applying the implicit-function rule to (2.6) and using (2.7) yields a







Finally we diﬀerentiate (2.6) with respect to k and l,which makes the second-order cross-









We now turn to the public sector. According to our deﬁnition of unit taxes,the public
resource constraint is given by:
R ≡ twL + trs + tsk − c(g)=0 , (2.10)
where c(g)denotes the per-capita cost function of the local public good. We assume that each
government chooses tax rates in order to maximize the representative individual’s indirect
utility function:
V ≡ U (e − s(ts,t r,t w),x 2 (ts,t r,t w),T− L(ts,t r,t w))+ ˜ U (g), (2.11)
subject to the public resource constraint (2.10). The Lagrangean of the problem:
W≡V (...) − ΛR, (2.12)
is supposed to be strictly concave in each of the tax instruments. We diﬀerentiate (2.12) with















































































= ˜ Ug +Λ cg =0 . (2.13d)
5For later purpose we use the slope of the factor price frontier (2.8),the labor market
clearing condition L = l and (2.4b) after diﬀerentiation of (2.4d),which gives:
k = −
∂x2
∂ts +( r − tr)
∂s





∂tr +( r − tr)
∂s





∂tw +( r − tr)
∂s
∂tw +( w − tw)
∂L
∂tw. (2.14c)
In the next step we use equations (2.14) and apply (2.4) to the ﬁrst-order conditions of
the government’s optimization problem (2.13),which yields:
∂W


























































= ˜ Ug +Λ cg =0 , (2.15d)
Due to the separability assumption in the utility function we can think of the ﬁscal decision
captured by (2.15) as taking place in two stages: ﬁrst the government sets public consump-
tion to satisfy the modiﬁed Samuelson condition (2.15d); then the government chooses tax
rates according to (2.15a)-(2.15c). In the following we concentrate on the second stage of
the optimization process where tax rates are determined.
Let  k,  s,  l denote the general equilibrium eﬀects of taxes on the tax bases,which we
deﬁne as the negative of the terms in brackets in (2.15). Then system (2.15) simpliﬁes to
(with instruments shown in parenthesis):
(ts): −Λ=Ux/(1 −  k), (2.16a)
(tr): −Λ=Ux/(1 −  s), (2.16b)
(tw): −Λ=Ux/(1 −  l). (2.16c)
Using (2.16) it is easy to describe any tax reform which either replaces one particular tax
by another or ﬁnances a marginal unit of additional public good supply by increasing a tax.
In the subsequent analysis we distinguish four diﬀerent ﬁscal scenarios by the combina-
tion of the three tax instruments. For the purpose of the analytical approach followed in this
section,it is useful to simplify the analysis by restricting our discussion to ﬁscal scenarios in
which only two tax instruments are simultaneously available for governments. This simpliﬁes
6the analysis to a great extend,since only the ﬁrst-order conditions of instruments chosen
endogenously must simultaneously hold with strict equality in (2.16),whereas the condition
of the unavailable instrument is redundant. In detail,for any combination of two taxes the



























∧ ts =0 . (2.19)
The last building block of our model is the Nash equilibrium on the international capital
market which determines the eﬀects of taxes on factor markets in (2.15)-(2.19). The Nash
equilibrium is fully described by the ﬁrst-order conditions of households [cf. eqs. (2.4)],ﬁrms
[cf. eqs. (2.7)] and the market clearing condition:
ki − si + ka − sa = Mi + Ma =0 . (2.20)
where we introduce net capital imports M ≡ k − s for further reference and indices i,a
in (2.20) to distinguish the two countries. Notice that we relegated the extensive derivations
of comparative static eﬀects of tax changes to the appendix. In the next section we use
the comparative static reactions on national labor and the international factor markets in
conditions (2.16) and yield the open economy’s non-cooperative tax structures. It then goes
to identify the eﬀects of tax competition on these tax formulae,i.e. tax base and terms of
trade eﬀects.
3 Basic Analytical Results
We now turn to an analytical description of tax structures in the international Nash equilib-
rium between unequal countries. First,consider the case where governments are constrained
not to levy wage taxes on the margin and only have access to both capital taxes. Inserting
the comparative statics of the capital market [see equations (A.4)-(A.7) in the appendix]
into condition (2.17) and employing (2.5),we yield the optimal tax structure from the














ll (φi + MiLi
w) − liki . (3.1)
According to (3.1) the tax structure in a tax competition environment is ambiguous in sign,
mainly due to the existence of (counteracting) tax base and terms of trade eﬀects. For the
following discussion it hence is useful to decompose (3.1) for both eﬀects:
7• First,we can isolate tax base eﬀects by restricting our analysis to the speciﬁc case of a
symmetric Nash equilibrium between equal countries. It is well-known that there are
no reasons for factor movements in a tax competition game between countries which









llφi − liki. (3.2)
Equation (3.2) replicates equation (22) in Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991). It recon-
structs their normative ﬁnding that a tax competition equilibrium in Nash strategies
between identical countries is constrained eﬃcient,if source- and residence-based cap-
ital taxes are available for governments.3 When the wage tax is absent,but both
capital taxes are available for ﬁscal authorities,tax competition does not cause any
additional distortions,given the available set of tax instruments. Also from a positive
point (3.2) may be surprising,since both taxes are levied with positive rates in the
symmetric Nash equilibrium. This seems to be in contrast with the analysis of Frenkel
et al. (1991) in a small-country model that production taxes will not be levied when a
residence-based capital tax is available in addition. As Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991)
already pointed out,here the result is driven by the assumption of equal but also
non-price-taking countries: Since the world interest rate is determined endogenously
in this model,governments use the source-based capital tax as a substitute for the
(unavailable) wage tax to tax away a part of labor income that can not be taxed
directly.
• Second,we turn to the discussion of terms of trade eﬀects which only occur when
countries are unequal - hence Mi  = 0 - and which are the cause of the overall ambiguity
in (3.1). The basic intuition is that the crediting country [i.e. Mi < 0] is interested in
strategically lowering source-based capital taxes in order to relieve or even subsidize
domestic investment. International capital supply is shortened by strategic tax policy
and the level of international capital movements is reduced below the level in a free-
trade equilibrium. Hence,the world interest rate rises and this depicts a terms of trade
gain for the capital exporting country. Additionally,a positive residence-based capital
tax strengthens the opportunity of the government to pursue strategictax policy,since,
on the one hand,this instrument further reduces national capital supply and,on the
other hand,is suﬃciently reliable to compensate for the loss in ﬁscal revenue caused
by lowered source-based capital taxes. From the perspective of a capital importing
country [i.e. Mi > 0] incentives are mostly inverse. The government attempts to
3To prove this rigorously we have to re-interprete the model slightly. If the two countries are supposed to
represent n homogeneous countries, introducing n in the capital market clearing condition (2.20) and per-
forming the tax incidence analysis establishes that (3.2) is independent of n in a symmetric Nash equilibrium.
8minimize international interest payments by strategically reducing the interest rate
via a reduction of international capital movements below the free-trade level. Hence,
to achieve a terms of trade gain,the capital importer aims at increasing home savings
and reduces home capital demand. From that intuition,the ﬁscal authority reduces
residence-based taxes or even subsidizes savings and simultaneously uses source-based
capital taxes. Therefore,non-cooperative tax rates depend on the sign of the net capital
balance. Since source-based capital taxes diﬀer,production eﬃciency is not supported
in a tax competition equilibrium between unequal countries.
So far we neglected the interactions on national labor markets in the interpretation
of (3.1). The argumentation complicates considerably if general equilibrium eﬀects of tax
rate changes on labor supply (via own- and cross-price eﬀects) are taken in account addition-
ally. Nevertheless,our discussion revealed that two factors are dominant in an asymmetric
Nash equilibrium: First,aggregate factor s upply and demand elasticities - particularly of
importance for tax base eﬀects - and second,the sign of the net capital balance - which
determines the consequences of changes in the world price for capital on national welfare.
From the course of the present discussion follows that there are clear limits for an
analytical approach to determine the incentives of governments in an asymmetric Nash
equilibrium when savings and labor supply decisions of individuals are subject to choice.4
We identiﬁed counteracting eﬀects without giving quantitative estimates for overall tax
structures. Moreover,complexity frustrates welfare analysis of decentral ﬁscal decisions since
cooperative equilibria are diﬃcult to determine analytically in a rather general framework.
Straightforward,we set up a numerical analysis in order to weight counteracting eﬀects on
the one hand and provide normative results on the other.
4 Numerical Analysis
4.1 Model Speciﬁcation
The numerical model is adopted from the theoretical section above. The speciﬁcation of the
production and utility functions is as follows. In each country output is generated according
to the Cobb-Douglas production function:
f (k,l)=kα l(1−α), 0 <α<1, (4.1)
4Further analysis proved that the equations for non-cooperative tax structures in tax environments with a
constrained set of ﬁscal instruments depicted by (2.18)-(2.19) get even more complicated than in (3.1) above.
Moreover, it turned out that no additional insight can be reaped. Hence, we do not report these complex
formulae in the paper.
9where technologies are identical across countries and the share of capital has been set at
α =0 .25. This is a rough estimate for the distribution between capital and wage income in
most OECD countries.
Preferences of the representative individual are of the constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) form. An advantage of the CES speciﬁcation is that this functional form allows to
specify a variety of substitution elasticities between zero and inﬁnity. The utility function




















where the parameters θ denote the shares of second period’s consumption,ﬁrst periods’
consumption,leisure consumption and public good supply. We abstract from diﬀerences in
preferences and assume the utility function to be identical across countries. The adding-up








g = 1. Therefore,we have one
degree of freedom to choose the three ratios of shares.
In our speciﬁcation we assume θx2/θF = 4. This ratio roughly corresponds to the weights
calibrated by Ballard,Fullerton,Shoven and Whalley (1985:130)for a large-scale tax reform
model based on U.S. data. Moreover we choose θx2/θG =4a n dθx2/θx1 =1 .11. The ﬁrst
ratio reﬂects that the share of government expenditures is about 25 percent of GDP in most
OECD countries and the second roughly corresponds to the proportion of savings on total
income. Sensitivity analyses have shown that our results are quite robust with respect to
the speciﬁcation of the shares. However,from the discussion in the previous section follows
that the elasticity of substitution is supposed to be critical in our analysis. For the purpose
of our aggregate substitution elasticity we consistently consider alternative scenarios with
σ =0 .5a n dσ ≈ 1,which cover most realistic cases.
4.2 Numerical Results
Numerical simulation experiments expand the preceding analysis in two respects: First,they
allow to identify second-best eﬃcient tax structures from an international perspective in an
environment with a complete set of distorting taxes set in addition to ﬁscal scenarios in
which governments only have access to a constrained set of two distortionary taxes. In our
experiments we hence distinguish four diﬀerent ﬁscal scenarios by the combination of the
three instruments. Secondly,we obtain normative results in all four cases by comparing
the tax competition equilibrium to the cooperative case when aggregated welfare of both
countries is maximized.
From our discussion in the analytical section follows that tax base and terms of trade
eﬀects strongly aﬀect non-cooperative tax structures. Whereas tax base eﬀects show negative
10repercussions on national welfare under the usual assumptions on factor supply functions
and produce positive ﬁscal externalities abroad,the welfare gains from terms of trade eﬀects
critically depend on the sign of the net capital balance: A reduction in the interest rate
depicts a terms of trade gain for a capital importing country and a welfare loss for a capital
exporting country. However,as also has become clear in the course of our hitherto discussion,
the incentives of governments to use distorting taxes strategically are diﬃcult to determine
analytically. Non-surprisingly,terms of trade eﬀects have often been neglected in the existing
literature on capital tax competition. In the following numerical simulation experiments
we thus emphasize the implications of terms of trade eﬀects on tax structures and world
eﬃciency. Our technique is to vary the distribution of residents between the two competing
countries,given constant ﬁrst period’s national capital endowments.
Only capital taxes available:
In our ﬁrst set of experiments we take up the scenario discussed in the analytical section. Ta-
ble 1 and ﬁgure 1 portray consumption levels and tax rates in a tax competition game when
per-capita capital endowment varies and ﬁscal authorities in both countries are constrained
to only use capital taxes. Specifying an empirically plausible value for the diﬀerence in per-
capita endowments clearly is a diﬃcult task,even if one accepts the two-country framework
we have applied here. In table 1 we describe the diﬀerences in consumption levels of the
four arguments in the utility function,which are expressed in percentage changes between
Nash and cooperative equilibria. Initially,the capital exporting country has a per-capita
capital endowment four times higher than the capital importing country (the ratio of sizes
is 20 : 80),but then we lower this ratio in our experiments until both countries are equal
(50 : 50). Turning ﬁrst to the case in table 1 in which diﬀerences in per-capita capital endow-
ments between both countries are most signiﬁcant,we notice that consumption structures
in the Nash equilibrium diﬀer remarkably compared to a cooperative equilibrium when ag-
gregated welfare is maximized. Local public goods are ‘overprovided’ in a capital exporting
country and the standard tax competition result of an ineﬃcient low level of public good
provision is obtained in the capital importing country. Numerical results further conﬁrm
the intuition from the discussion in the analytical section that terms of trade eﬀects are
crucial for the incentives of governments between unequal countries to set taxes strategi-
cally. National capital supply is ineﬃcient high in the capital importing country,whereas
the government in the crediting country sets taxes to reduce savings of residents in order to
achieve terms of trade gains.
According to table 1 ineﬃciencies shrink monotonously with decreasing diﬀerences be-
tween the competitors. The consumption structure in the symmetric Nash equilibrium be-
tween equal countries coincidences with the consumption structure in the eﬃcient bench-
11Symbol Sizea gs F x 2
Capital exporting
country
◦ 20 49.6 -20.5 7.2 28.4
M 30 23.9 -18.7 3.7 13.8
O 40 9.2 -12.5 1.7 5.4
Symmetric Nash
equilibrium
F 50 0 0 0 0
Capital importing
country
H 60 -8.5 25.0 -1.1 -4.0
N 70 -16.2 97.8 -2.1 -7.0
• 80 -25.0 – -3.2 -9.4
aShare in population of a country at given world population
Table 1: Percentage changes in consumption levels between the Nash and cooperative equilibrium for diﬀerent
endowment patterns when only source-based and residence-based capital taxes are available.
Note:
Tax structures in the capital exporting country: ◦,
M and
O. The corresponding tax structures in the compet-
ing, capital importing country are represented by black symbols. The tax structure in the symmetric Nash
equilibrium is depicted by point  .




i conditional on per-capita endowment and elasticity of substitution σ.
12mark. Our simulations hence reproduce the result established by Bucovetsky and Wilson
(1991): Decentralized ﬁscal decisions lead to an eﬃcient Nash equilibrium even in the ab-
sence of wage taxes,provided countries are identical in all respects. The intuition is that
the source-based capital tax serves well as a substitute for the missing wage tax. Hence,
the government has the necessary set of taxes available to support an eﬃcient allocation in
the decentral Nash equilibrium. Our numerical simulations also indicate,however,that an
eﬃcient allocation is not supported if countries are unequal.
Curve σ =0 .5 in ﬁgure 1 describes the eﬀect of international inequalities in per-capita
endowments on non-cooperative tax structures. The capital exporting country sets the
residence-based capital tax at a high rate,whereas the source-based capital tax is set at
a low level by the government when compared to the tax rates chosen by the competitor.
The intuition here is that a capital exporting country maximizes interest payments accruing
from the debtor. The creditor country can achieve a terms of trade gain by strategically
reducing home savings and promoting home investment. Turning to the incentives in a cap-
ital importing country,we notice from ﬁgure 1 that the government reduces residence-based
capital taxes and increases source-based capital taxes in order to lower the world interest
rate by reducing net capital imports. Since source-based capital taxes diﬀer between the two
countries,the marginal productivity of capital is not equalized internationally and produc-
tion eﬃciency is not supported in the asymmetric Nash equilibrium. In contrast,terms of
trade eﬀects are irrelevant when countries are equal. Tax rates are levied at equal,positive
rates under the CES speciﬁcation of the utility function. Hence,the international capital
allocation must be eﬃcient and this is in accordance with our discussion of (3.2) in the
analytical section.
Sensitivity analysis shows that results do not change qualitatively if the elasticity of
substitution is set from σ =0 .5 to a perhaps unrealistic high value of σ ≈ 1. In ﬁgure 1
this is reﬂected by a shift of the curve which inﬂuences tax rates but does not change tax
structures fundamentally.5
Only source-based capital and wage taxes available:
In our second ﬁscal scenario we assume that source-based capital and wage taxes are in the
set of instruments available for governments,but ﬁscal authorities are restricted in their ac-
cess to residence-based capital taxes. From table 2 we obtain the standard tax competition
result that local public goods are underprovided. This result holds independently of the sign
of net capital balance,but is most signiﬁcant in the case of a large capital exporter [ﬁrst
5Of course, if σ approaches zero, a case sensibly excluded here, taxes on consumption are lump-sum.
In this case the government can choose wage and residence-based capital taxes arbitrarily. In a ﬁrst-best
scenario, tax competition will not be a problem.
13Symbol Sizea gs F x 2
Capital exporting coun-
try
◦ 20 -7.4 -0.9 3.9 7.0
M 30 -4.6 0.9 5.1 4.3
O 40 -3.1 3.5 5.0 2.8
Symmetric Nash equilib-
rium
F 50 -2.3 6.5 4.2 1.2
Capital importing coun-
try
H 60 -1.5 10.5 3.1 0.3
N 70 -1.5 14.9 1.8 -0.5
• 80 -1.5 29.2 0.7 -0.5
aShare in population of a country at given world population
Table 2: Percentage changes in consumption levels between the Nash and cooperative equilibrium for diﬀerent
endowment patterns when only source-based capital and wage taxes are available.
Note:
Tax structures in the capital exporting country: ◦,
M and
O. The corresponding tax structures in the compet-
ing, capital importing country are represented by black symbols. The tax structure in the symmetric Nash
equilibrium is depicted by point  .




i conditional on per-capita endowment and elasticity of substitution σ.
14row in table 2],in which consumption levels of all private goods rise clearly (compared to
the cooperative benchmark) in exchange to public good provision. We therefore conclude
that tax base eﬀects dominate terms of trade eﬀects in this scenario. Nevertheless,terms of
trade eﬀects are observed,which is suggested by the fact that the increase in per-capita na-
tional savings is higher in a capital importing country as compared to the capital exporters’
situation.
In contrast,terms of trade eﬀects are irrelevant in the symmetric Nash equilibrium. The
level of public good provision,however,is not eﬃcient. The intuition is that the government
can not eﬀectively tax the incomes of all factors subject to choice by residents: The source-
based capital tax serves well as a substitute for a missing wage tax (as has become clear
from the discussion of our ﬁrst experiment),but is unsuitable to replace a tax on savings
income.6
The curve σ =0 .5 in ﬁgure 2 represents the locus of tax structures for varying per-capita
endowments. It conﬁrms our intuition that terms of trade and tax base eﬀects of source-
based capital and wage taxes tend to work in the same direction in a capital exporting
country,but the eﬀect of wage taxes on the net capital balance is comparatively weak. In
fact,the wage tax ﬁrst distorts the national labor market and hence has only an indirect
eﬀect on the capital intensity in private production. This argument is conﬁrmed by the result
that the wage tax is used in ﬁrst line in order to generate public revenue. The incentives for
a ﬁscal authority in the capital importing country are inverse. Here,source-based capital
taxes generate terms of trade gains since they lower national capital demand.7
Only residence-based capital and wage taxes available:
In the third scenario,depicted by table 3 and ﬁgure 3,governments are assumed to only
rely on residence-based capital and wage taxes,but not on source-based capital taxes. In
contrast to our results in the ﬁrst case,here it is the capital importing country where
local public goods are provided at an ineﬃcient high level,whereas the government in the
capital exporting country underprovides the public good according to table 3. Moreover,
demands for all private goods (except for ﬁrst period’s consumption) are ineﬃciently low
in the capital exporting country. Hence,the results summarized in table 3 suggest that the
capital exporter looses in the Nash equilibrium compared to the cooperative equilibrium
and the capital importing country gains. We will verify that intuition in our subsequent
6Hence, wage income eﬀectively carries the burden of public spending. Consistently, leisure consumption
and savings increase in the symmetric case of table 2.
7The curve in ﬁgure 2 is backward bending for a large capital exporter. At a high level of international
capital movements the rate of capital tax is increased by the government in order to maximize terms of trade
eﬀects and not to hamper international capital movements ’too‘ much.
15Symbol Sizea gs F x 2
Capital exporting
country
◦ 20 -2.2 -4.9 -8.8 -0.8
M 30 -1.2 -4.7 -5.1 -0.4






H 60 0.5 5.1 2.0 0.3
N 70 1.0 12.4 3.2 0.8
• 80 1.6 25.1 4.4 1.7
aShare in population of a country at given world population
Table 3: Percentage changes in consumption levels between the Nash and cooperative equilibrium for diﬀerent
endowment patterns when only residence-based capital and wage taxes are available.
Note:
Tax structures in the capital exporting country: ◦,
M and
O. The corresponding tax structures in the compet-
ing, capital importing country are represented by black symbols. The tax structure in the symmetric Nash
equilibrium is depicted by point  .




i conditional on per-capita endowment and elasticity of substitution σ.
16discussion about the incentives of governments to vote in favor of a consistent international
tax agreement. Also notice that ineﬃciencies decrease in direction towards a symmetric
Nash equilibrium when both countries are equal in all respects.
Figure 3 depicts the tax structures in the tax competition game. The government in
a capital exporting country subsidizes labor supply (which increases the productiveness of
home capital investment) and levies residence-based capital taxes (which causes a discrep-
ancy between the net interest rate and the rate of time preference) in order to shorten
international capital supply.
In the symmetric case,however,terms of trade eﬀects become irrelevant and taxes on
the incomes of both factors subject to choice are levied eﬃciently in the decentral Nash
equilibrium. This result is in fact very closely related to the Production Eﬃciency lemma.
Aggregate consumption is on the economy’s production frontier in this case,since the gov-
ernment can levy taxes on the incomes of all factors subject to choice by households. If
per-capita capital endowment falls in addition to the symmetric case,the wage tax is set
almost independently of the capital tax. A capital importer strategically relieves or sub-
sidizes national per-capita savings in order to increase international capital supply,which
means to eﬀectively use terms of trade eﬀects. It is reasonable that the capital importer
gains from tax competition in this ﬁscal environment,since the ﬁscal revenue of the wage
tax is suﬃcient reliable to subsidize savings optimally from the government’s point of view.
To summarize,we conclude that tax competition equilibria generally are ineﬃcient in this
case in which residence-based capital taxes exist and the international capital allocation is
undistorted (since source-based capital taxes are absent).
Unconstrained set of taxes available:
Finally,we discuss the case in which an unconstrained set of ﬁscal instruments is availablefor
ﬁscal authorities. Table 4 and ﬁgure 4 portray consumption levels and tax structures in the
asymmetric Nash equilibrium conditional to per-capita endowments. As in the previous case,
local public goods are provided at an ineﬃcient low level in a capital exporting country and
are provided at an ineﬃcient high level in a capital importing country. However,ineﬃciencies
are reduced in direction towards the symmetric Nash equilibrium. This result is conﬁrmed
by the study of Eggert (1998) who proves analytically that a tax competition equilibrium
in residence-based capital and wage taxes between large countries is second-best eﬃcient if
countries are equal in all respects.
Turning to the tax structures it is obvious from ﬁgure 4 that source-based capital taxes
are not levied by governments in a tax competition game between equal countries. Gov-
ernments rely on residence-based capital and wage taxes,which only distort consumption
but not production decisions. However,production eﬃciency is not supported in asymmet-
17Sizea gsF x 2
Capital exporting
country
20 -10.4 -5.8 -15.4 -10.2
30 -5.9 -4.5 -7.9 -6.2






60 2.0 3.0 2.0 2.1
70 2.6 6.9 3.2 3.6
80 3.8 12.4 3.7 4.2
aShare in population of a country at given world population
Table 4: Percentage changes in consumption levels between the Nash and cooperative equilibrium for diﬀerent
endowment patterns when the set of ﬁscal instruments is unconstrained.
Note:
Per-capita capital endowment decreases from the left to the right, the tax structure in the symmetric Nash
equilibrium is depicted by stars  






i conditional on per-capita endowment and elasticity of substitution σ.
18tax system two iden- capital impor- capital expor-
case instruments tical countries ting countrya ting countryb
a ts
i,t r
i 313.740 (0) 276.506(-14.6) 469.200(30.6)
b ts
i,t w
i 369.628(-0.2) 335.247 (-1.3) 489.529 (1.9)
c tr
i,t w




i 370.301 (0) 325.801 (2.3) 529.103(-8.7)
aPopulation share of 80 percent on world population.
bPopulation share of 20 percent on world population.
Table 5: Per-capita utility levels in tax competition scenarios (deviation to cooperative equilibria in paren-
theses)
ric Nash equilibria,because source-based capital taxes are used strategically and hence at
diﬀerent rates: The capital exporting country subsidizes home capital investment and the
capital importing country levies positive source-based capital taxes due to terms of trade
considerations. The marginal productivity of capital is not equalized internationally. Hence,
aggregated world production is not maximized. Governments also use residence-based cap-
ital taxes in order to aﬀect terms of trade strategically. The capital exporter cuts back on
net capital exports by taxing domestic savings,whereas the capital importer aims at reduc-
ing net capital imports and subsidizes domestic savings. In contrast,governments of both
countries set taxes on the income of internationally immobile labor at positive rates. This
result should be intuitive,since the strategic eﬀect of the wage tax instrument on the net
capital balance is dominated by direct taxes on capital.
Lastly turning to table 5 we discuss the question whether unequal countries have incen-
tives to vote in favor of a uniform international system for direct taxes. According to our
results a capital importing country prefers the Nash equilibrium in labor and source-based
capital taxes to all other non-cooperative cases [row b in table 5] and should reject any
proposal to eﬀectively enforce taxes on worldwide interest income. This is in clear contrast
to the results in the symmetric Nash equilibria [the ﬁrst column in table 5] which would
predict that competing countries reach an agreement to eﬀectively enforce international
taxation of interest income according to the residence principle. But the prediction of the
symmetric models that countries agree to eﬀectively enforce residence-based capital taxes is
19not supported by reality.8
5 Conclusions
This paper has focused on the optimal mix of direct taxes when a country faces domestic
or international constraints on the set of available tax instruments. It has been shown that,
due to the existence of pecuniary and ﬁscal externalities,the opening of a country’s borders
not necessarily expands a country’s consumption possibilities.
In a theoretical analysis of asymmetric Nash equilibria between large countries terms
of trade and tax base eﬀects were isolated as important factors which considerably deter-
mine the incentives for a country to act strategically. However,the analytical approach was
obviously limited due to the complex model structure. Therefore,numerical simulation ex-
periments of the model were used in order to weight the counteracting eﬀects on the tax
rates and to implement a welfare analysis for each scenario. The simulation results indicated
that the advantageous features of residence-based capital taxes known from the previous lit-
erature about tax competition games between symmetric countries do not carry over to the
asymmetric case. In all four ﬁscal scenarios terms of trade eﬀects caused an ineﬃciency of
the decentralized Nash equilibrium,whether or not residence-based capital taxes are avail-
able for ﬁscal authorities. However,a precautionary note is appropriate if results are taken
as a guide for international tax policy since it also turned out that no systematic welfare
gains can be reaped from distorting production decisions via source-based capital taxes.
Therefore there may still be a case for residence-based capital taxes which only distort
consumption decisions but not production decisions. However,from a positive point of view,
our numerical results indicated that - given only wage taxes and source-based capital taxes
are in the set of available tax instruments - a capital importing country might frustrate inter-
national eﬀorts to establish residence-based taxes. In contrast,a capital exporting country
is better oﬀ in the non-cooperative equilibrium with a full tax instrument set,compared to a
Nash equilibrium when only wage and source-based capital taxes are available. This country
has an incentive to vote in favor of mutual tax assistance. However,the prediction is that -
without compensating transfer payments - international compliance for such an assistance
might not be easy to reach.
8From table 5 it is seen that the two equal countries obtain a higher welfare level in the symmetric tax













is ineﬃcient. This demonstrates the value of a numerical analysis, which allows to order the Nash equilibria
by welfare levels.
20A Appendix
The basic purpose of the appendix is to derive the comparative static eﬀects in the Nash
equilibrium on the international capital market. In the open economy,factors s upplied and
demanded can be derived as implicit functions from the ﬁrst-order conditions of house-
holds (2.4),ﬁrms (2.7),the market clearing conditions for national labor and the interna-








































kkdkj − dr − dts
j =0 ∀j ∈{ i,a}, (A.1d)
dlj − dLj =0 ∀j ∈{ i,a}, (A.1e)
dki − dsi + dka − dsa =0 . (A.1f)




















































































dki − dsi + dka − dsa =0 .
21From (2.5) and (2.9) this equation system can be written in matrices as follows:
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11 −1 −10 0

 






















































































where Mi = −Ma has been used.
Assume |
H|  = 0. Applying Cramer’s rule to (A.2) we yield the eﬀects of the international
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